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Security, data and the supplier record

Who you contract with, where data is held, which security controls run today and which do not, and the record your DORA register needs. Gaps are listed next to what is in place.

Page reviewed on 19 October 2026. Controls were verified against the running systems on 8 August 2026 unless a row gives a later date.

Rebuild from backup, 20 September 2026

1 h 25 minagainst an internal target of 8 h

Measured
Recovery point
The restored database was about 10 hours behind production, with no files lost.
Next drill
Due 11 December 2026
Measured by Michal Jatczak on a replacement machine rebuilt from ITSailor's own backup. One sample on one date.

Read the bounds of this figure

At a glance

The six facts a supplier review asks for first. Each one links to its detail or to the register that holds it.

Supplier
Michal Jatczak, sole trader registered in Malta
Trading as ITSailor. Malta VAT registered; invoices are issued in this name.
Registration numbers and checks
Microsoft partner
Partner Location Account 7113951
Microsoft Authorized Partner. Licences through Pax8 as a CSP Indirect Reseller.
Open the partner record (opens in a new tab)
Data location
Core systems in Germany
Servers, databases and backups in Falkenstein; website functions in Frankfurt. Providers outside the EEA are named.
Sub-processors
Security controls
23 of 36 measures in place
2 partial and 11 not in place. 5 of the in-place measures carry a stated limit.
Read the controls
Certification
None held
No ISO/IEC 27001, no SOC 2, no Cyber Essentials and no penetration test report.
What you get instead
Exit
Exit Kit within 24 hours of engagement close
Documentation, baselines, infrastructure-as-code, runbooks and a credentials map, under a Statement of Work.
Terms, section 07

Data handling

Where personal data is held and processed, and the terms that govern it.

Servers, databases, backups
Hetzner, Falkenstein, Germany.
Website functions
Vercel, Frankfurt, Germany (fra1). Static files and request logs are served from Vercel's global edge network.
Business email and files
Microsoft 365, EU region.
Short-lived tool data
Upstash, Ireland (AWS eu-west-1): scan results for ten minutes, rate limits, sign-in state, and Tenant Security Scorecard trend scores for 180 days if you ask for them.
Outside the EEA
Some providers process outside the EEA, among them email delivery, AI report drafting, DNS and the tunnel, code hosting, booking and, if you accept it, analytics. Each one is named under Sub-processors with its location. Transfers rest on the Standard Contractual Clauses, and also on the EU-US Data Privacy Framework where the provider is certified.
Connected tenants
Every Microsoft permission a free tool requests is a read permission. One Google Workspace permission has no read-only variant; the permissions page names it and the two things we read with it. Permissions by connector
Processor terms
The Article 28 terms are part of the Terms of Service. They apply when an administrator connects a tenant or assigns a role, to managed automation packages, and to engagements under a Statement of Work. Terms, section 14

Sub-processors

Every provider that processes personal data on our instruction, from the same list the Privacy Policy publishes. A customer whose data we process gets at least 30 days' notice by email before a new one starts processing it.

Stripe Payments Europe Ltd.Ireland
Purpose
Payments. Stripe is also an independent controller for its own fraud prevention, financial risk, AML and KYC obligations and product development
Transfers
SCCs and Data Privacy Framework
Microsoft Ireland Operations Limited (Microsoft 365)EU
Purpose
Our business email and files
Transfers
Standard Contractual Clauses
Hetzner Online GmbHGermany
Purpose
Our servers, databases and backups, including the automation server that runs managed automation packages
Transfers
Stays in the EEA
Vercel, Inc.Functions in Frankfurt; edge network and analytics outside the EEA
Purpose
Website hosting, and analytics only if you accept it; the analytics is cookie-free and not used for advertising or cross-site profiling. Vercel is also an independent controller for the usage data its service generates
Transfers
SCCs and Data Privacy Framework
Cloudflare, Inc.Global network
Purpose
DNS and a secure tunnel to our servers
Transfers
SCCs and Data Privacy Framework
Resend (Plus Five Five, Inc.)United States
Purpose
Sending email: our own, and the email our managed automation packages send for a client
Transfers
SCCs and Data Privacy Framework
Upstash, Inc.Ireland
Purpose
Tool and security data: rate limits, sign-in state, scan results for up to 10 minutes, and Tenant Security Scorecard trend scores for up to 180 days
Transfers
Standard Contractual Clauses
GitHub, Inc.United States
Purpose
Private repositories for client deliverables
Transfers
SCCs and Data Privacy Framework
OpenAI (API)Outside the EEA
Purpose
Writing free-tool reports. API inputs are not used to train models
Transfers
Standard Contractual Clauses
Anthropic (Claude API)Outside the EEA
Purpose
SaaS Auditor briefs from aggregate figures, and contract extraction when you upload a contract. API inputs are not used to train models
Transfers
Standard Contractual Clauses
Mistral AIEU and EFTA
Purpose
AI steps in the managed automation packages, on its EU endpoint. Mistral is also an independent controller for the abuse monitoring its terms provide for
Transfers
Standard Contractual Clauses
Cal.comOutside the EEA
Purpose
Booking calls and workshop sessions
Transfers
Standard Contractual Clauses
DocRaptorOutside the EEA
Purpose
Producing eBook PDFs, which carry the buyer's email in the licence line
Transfers
Standard Contractual Clauses

Recipients that are not our sub-processors

Microsoft Ireland Operations Limited (licences)
Not our sub-processor. Licensor of the Microsoft licences you buy through us; it processes your tenant content as your provider, under its agreement with you.
Pax8, Inc.
Not our sub-processor. Our distributor; it receives licence order details to fulfil your order, under its own terms. Your tenant data does not reach it.
Telegram Messenger Inc.
Not our sub-processor. Messaging service that carries alerts and approval notices from our managed automation packages to the staff accounts that asked for them, and to us, under its own terms. It receives no personal data of a client's customers: a message carries a reference, a count or a status and a link to our own server.

Security controls

The measures Article 32 GDPR asks for, extracted from the internal record of processing with the status each one actually has. A few rows can be checked from outside and say so; the others rest on records and code that are not public, so read them as terms held in writing.

In place
running on the date the row gives, or on 8 August 2026 where it gives none
Partial
running for part of the scope
Not in place
not implemented, and nothing is promised by listing it

Encryption and identifiers

5 in place, 1 not in place
  • Transport encryption

    In place

    All public traffic is served over HTTPS with a strict transport security header, subdomains included and preload set: two years on this website, one year on the API and the automation service, where the network provider in front of them sets it. You can read the header on the response for this page.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(a)

  • Minimum TLS version

    In placemeasured 20 September 2026

    TLS 1.2 is the floor on every public hostname: TLS 1.0 and 1.1 handshakes were refused when measured on 20 September 2026. The setting belongs to the hosting providers, so it is measured again at every quarterly drill. You can check it by offering TLS 1.1 with an SSL client.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(a)

  • Identifiers before they reach a log

    In place

    Directory identities are replaced with a keyed one-way digest (HMAC-SHA-256 under a server key) before anything is logged. This is pseudonymisation under Article 4(5): ITSailor holds the key, so the log data remains personal data.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(a)

  • Short-lived tenant scan results

    In place

    A free-tool scan result is kept for up to ten minutes, encrypted with AES-256-GCM under a key the database provider does not hold. Without the key the scan does not start, and there is no plaintext fallback. The database runs in Ireland, inside the EEA.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(a)

  • Off-site backups encrypted at rest

    In place

    Each backup bundle is encrypted on the host before it leaves, to two keys whose private halves are not on that host: one is in a password manager, one on an offline drive. Environment files stay out of the bundle. Database dumps travel inside it, so stored credentials are carried as ciphertext and password hashes.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(a), DORA Art. 12(2)

  • Encryption at rest of the production database volume

    Not in place

    Not implemented. The databases run in containers on one server with no disk or volume encryption, so a physical or hypervisor-level compromise is not mitigated.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(a)

Platform and detection

8 in place, 1 partial, 3 not in place
  • Network exposure

    In place

    Applications are published through an outbound-only tunnel, and no application port is reachable from the internet. SSH is the only service on the production host that accepts traffic from the internet, read off the host on 21 September 2026.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(b), NIS2 Art. 21(2)(i)

  • Remote administrative access

    In place

    SSH by public key only, through a named non-root account. Root login and password authentication are disabled, and repeated failures from one source are banned automatically.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(b), NIS2 Art. 21(2)(i)

  • Patching

    In place

    Operating system security updates install automatically. Restarts do not, so a kernel fix waits for a manual reboot. Application images are pinned to exact versions, so a rebuild reproduces what runs.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(b), NIS2 Art. 21(2)(e)

  • Browser-side hardening

    In place

    Every response from this website carries a content security policy, nosniff, a frame-ancestors restriction, a referrer policy and a permissions policy. The policy allows inline script, so the defence against injected script is sanitising untrusted HTML where it is rendered. The API sends its own policy; the automation service sends nosniff only.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(b)

  • Abuse and brute-force control

    In place

    Sliding-window rate limits on sign-in, password reset, public forms, the consent record, checkout and document rendering. If the limit store is unreachable, checkout and document rendering fall back to a count kept by each server instance, and public forms are accepted without a limit.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(b)

  • Change control

    In placeas a convention, not as an enforced control

    Every change to the production website goes through a pull request with the automated gate. The gate reports and does not block: no repository ruleset or code-owner rule enforces it.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(b), NIS2 Art. 21(2)(e)

  • Availability monitoring

    In place

    External monitors run by UptimeRobot check the API, the customer portal, this website and the automation service every five minutes and alert by email. The results are on a public status page.Open the status page

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(b), NIS2 Art. 21(2)(b)

  • Availability service level

    Not in place

    None is offered. UptimeRobot publishes the observed uptime of each monitored service on the public status page. ITSailor commits to no level and publishes no figure of its own.Open the status page

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(b)

  • Security event detection and alerting

    Not in place

    No central log aggregation, no security information and event management system, and no alerting on security events. Alerts cover availability only, so a security event is found when someone looks.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(b), NIS2 Art. 21(2)(b)

  • Backup state alerting

    In place

    An external monitor expects every scheduled backup run: a failure, or a run that never starts, raises an email alert. A forced failure proved the alarm on 28 August 2026. The alert reaches one person, and the credential that reports health sits on the production host, so a compromise of that host could report a healthy run that did not happen.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(b), DORA Art. 12(2)

  • Server-side logging

    Partial

    Structured logging with stable event names exists through a shared module. Most server logging is still plain console output.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(b)

  • Log integrity

    Not in place

    No write-once or tamper-evident log storage is operated.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(b)

Backup and restore

3 in place, 3 not in place
  • Automated twice daily backup

    In place

    At 03:00 and 15:00 Malta time both production databases, the uploads and the automation data are bundled and shipped off-site to a storage box in Falkenstein, Germany. A bundle from this schedule was restored onto a replacement machine on 20 September 2026.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(c), DORA Art. 12(1)(a)

  • A copy the production host cannot delete

    In place

    Daily provider-side snapshots, which the production host holds no credential to create, change or delete. Tested on 11 August 2026: a file deleted by the backup identity was recovered from a snapshot with a matching digest. The recovery window is bounded by the number of snapshot slots.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(c), DORA Art. 12(3)

  • Documented restore procedure

    In place

    A restore script and a step-by-step procedure exist, from stopping the services to checking that both health endpoints answer.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(c), DORA Art. 12(1)(b)

  • Geographic separation of the off-site copy

    Not in place

    The off-site copy is in the same location as the production host, with no second region and no second provider, so a regional loss takes both.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(c), DORA Art. 12(2)

  • Recovery point objective

    Not in place

    None is committed. Two runs a day bound the loss at twelve hours. The rebuild of 20 September 2026 lost ten hours of database change and no files.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(c), DORA Art. 12(6)

  • Recovery time objective

    Not in place

    None is committed. The rebuild of 20 September 2026 took one hour and twenty-five minutes against an internal target of eight hours. It is one sample, with the bounds stated in the drill record on this page.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(c), DORA Art. 12(6)

Rebuild from backup, 20 September 2026Measured

1 h 25 minagainst an internal target of 8 h

Recovery point
The restored database was about 10 hours behind production, with no files lost.
Next drill
Due 11 December 2026
  • The public hostname stayed pointed at production, so no name service or tunnel cutover time is included.

Measured by Michal Jatczak on a replacement machine rebuilt from ITSailor's own backup. One sample on one date.

Testing and vulnerability handling

6 in place, 1 partial, 2 not in place
  • Automated gate on every change

    In placeas a reporting gate

    Every pull request and every push to main runs the linter, a type check, the full test suite, a production build, a prerender check, a bundle budget and a secret guard.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(d), NIS2 Art. 21(2)(e)

  • Tested controls, not only tested code

    In place

    Tests in the gate fail when the published connector permissions differ from what the connectors request, when the sub-processor list and the Privacy Policy disagree, or when a page makes a claim the claim gate bans.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(d)

  • Dependency inventory

    In placefrontend package tree only

    A CycloneDX software bill of materials of the frontend package tree is produced weekly from the main branch and on demand. The container images on the production host are not in it.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(d), NIS2 Art. 21(2)(e)

  • Dependency vulnerability scanning

    In place

    Grouped update pull requests for the application, the scripts, the pipeline actions and the pinned images, and a weekly audit against two advisory databases. A high or critical finding in code that reaches a user turns the security scan red; findings in container images and development-only packages report. Three of the scanned images are configured on the production host and scanned from a version list transcribed in June 2026, so a clean result proves that list rather than the running images. There is no static analysis of the code ITSailor writes.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(d), NIS2 Art. 21(2)(e)

  • Restore proved

    In placetwo dated events, one of them a rebuild from nothing

    On 11 June 2026 a database restore ran on the production host. On 20 September 2026 the whole estate was rebuilt from one encrypted off-site bundle on a throwaway machine and reconciled by row and file count. Production was not modified.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(c), DORA Art. 12(2)

  • Recurring restore drill

    Partial

    The first drill ran on 20 September 2026. The programme is quarterly, and one drill is a single data point: the second is due 11 December 2026.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(d), DORA Art. 11(6)

  • Penetration testing

    Not in place

    None has been performed, so no report exists to offer or summarise.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(d)

  • Periodic access review

    Not in place

    There is no documented periodic review of which provider console holds which access.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(d), NIS2 Art. 21(2)(i)

  • Vulnerability reports from outside

    In place

    A security contact is published under RFC 9116, with the scope and the safe harbour on this page.

    NIS2 Art. 21(2)(e)

People

1 in place, 2 not in place
  • People with access to customer personal data

    In place

    One. There are no employees, and no contractor holds standing access to production systems or customer data.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(b), DORA Art. 29

  • Separation of duties

    Not in placestructural, and disclosed

    Not possible in a one-person business: the same person writes, reviews, approves and deploys a change. The automated gate is the only independent check before production.

    GDPR Art. 32(1)(b), DORA Art. 29

  • A second operator

    Not in placestructural, and disclosed

    There is none. The service, and any restore, depend on one person and on that person's password manager. Record it as concentration risk.

    DORA Art. 29, NIS2 Art. 21(2)(d)

Certificates, reports and insurance not held

  • No ISO/IEC 27001 certification.
  • No SOC 2 attestation of any type.
  • No Cyber Essentials or equivalent scheme certificate.
  • No Cloud Security Alliance STAR registry entry.
  • No penetration test report.
  • No professional indemnity or cyber insurance.

Where a procurement process requires a certificate, ITSailor cannot supply one. It can supply an extract of this record and the audit and information rights in the processor terms. The GDPR, DORA and NIS2 references show which of your own obligations a row can support, where those frameworks apply to you. Where a procurement process asks for insurance, there is no policy to show; liability follows section 11 of the Terms of Service or a signed agreement.

Supplier record

For the register of information DORA Articles 28 to 30 require. One block to copy; every field survives the paste.

Legal entity
Michal Jatczak, sole trader registered in Malta
Trading name
ITSailor
VAT identification
MT32760411
D-U-N-S
507601021
Function supported
ICT consultancy, Microsoft 365 and Azure architecture and security, managed automation packages, and cost tooling
Microsoft Partner Location Account
7113951
Data location
Servers, databases and backups on Hetzner, Falkenstein, Germany; functions in Vercel Frankfurt (fra1). Providers outside the EEA are named in the sub-processor register
Sub-processors
itsailor.io/legal/subprocessors, summarised at itsailor.io/trust#sub-processors
Processor terms
Processor terms are part of the Terms of Service
Exit strategy
Exit Kit delivered within 24 hours of SOW engagement close. No request required
Exit clause
itsailor.io/legal/terms#exit-kit
Deliverable licence
Perpetual, irrevocable, royalty-free licence; may be passed to a successor supplier without approval
Position in the chain (asserted)
Direct provider. Microsoft CSP Indirect Reseller via the Pax8 marketplace. Written confirmation on request

Reviewed on 2026-10-19.

Both registers are search forms: paste the number shown here.

Terms behind the record

The Exit Kit is delivered within 24 hours of engagement close on a SOW engagement.
A contract term, delivered without a request: documentation, configuration baselines, infrastructure-as-code, runbooks and a map of where each credential is kept and who holds it, never the secrets themselves. For the workshop, the Exit Kit is part of the deliverable pack.
CommittedTerms, section 07
Every deliverable is licensed to you perpetually and irrevocably, and you may pass it to a successor supplier without asking us.
A perpetual, irrevocable, royalty-free licence to the documents, configurations, code and runbooks delivered to you, once paid for. A Statement of Work may assign specific material to you instead. Third-party and open-source components keep their own licences, and Microsoft licences bought through us stay with the vendor under the CSP Marketplace Terms.
CommittedTerms, section 06, licence and ownership

Procurement

Questionnaires and contracts
legal@itsailor.io

DORA Article 30(2) against the Terms

Each of the nine points with the Terms section that answers it. For a financial entity, the points the Terms leave open are agreed in a signed document before the service starts.
(a)
Description of the services and conditions for subcontracting
Terms, section 04Terms, section 14
(b)
Locations where data is processed, and notice of a change
Terms, section 14
(c)
Confidentiality and protection of data
Terms, section 13Terms, section 14
(d)
Access to and return of data and deliverables at the end
Terms, section 07Terms, section 16
(e)
Service levels
Not covered; agreed per engagement. Terms, section 15
(f)
Assistance with an ICT incident
Not covered; agreed per engagement. Terms, section 15
(g)
Cooperation with competent authorities
Not covered; agreed per engagement. Terms, section 15
(h)
Termination rights and notice periods
Terms, section 16
(i)
Taking part in your ICT security awareness programmes
Not covered; agreed per engagement. Terms, section 15

Vulnerability disclosure

How to report a security issue, what you may test, and the safe harbour that covers it.

Report to

security@itsailor.io
Machine-readable
/.well-known/security.txt under RFC 9116
Languages
English or Polish
Response
One person reads the mailbox, so no response time is committed. If you need an acknowledgement by a date, say so in the message.
You may test
The public website and the publicly reachable endpoints of the ITSailor tools, from your own account or your own tenant.
Stay within these limits
No denial of service or load testing, no scanning that degrades the service for others, no social engineering of the founder or any provider, no physical testing, and no access to another customer's data. If a proof of concept would need someone else's data, stop and describe the path.
Out of scope
Customer Microsoft 365 and Google Workspace tenants, which are not ours to authorise, and the platforms of the providers listed under Sub-processors, which run their own disclosure programmes.
Safe harbour
This policy is the written permission of Michal Jatczak, as owner of these systems, to test them within these limits. If you stay within them, act in good faith and give him reasonable time to fix an issue before you disclose it, your testing is authorised: he will not bring or support a civil claim or a criminal complaint against you for it, or treat it as a breach of the Terms, and if anyone else raises it he will confirm in writing that it was authorised. This binds no other person or authority, authorises no access to anyone else's data or systems, and carries no bounty. Testing beyond these limits needs separate written permission; Terms, section 09 sets the rule.

Data subject requests go to privacy@itsailor.io.

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